Context:

The recent controversy surrounding Justice Yashwant Varma and the subsequent remarks by Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar have reignited a crucial debate in Indian constitutional discourse: How can the judiciary remain independent while also being held accountable? At the heart of this debate lies the tension between institutional autonomy and the growing demand for transparency in judicial conduct.

The Varma Case: Catalyst for a Larger Debate

In March 2024, unaccounted cash was reportedly found at the residence of Justice Yashwant Varma, then serving on the Delhi High Court. Following the discovery, he was transferred to the Allahabad High Court. An in-house inquiry conducted by the Supreme Court found him culpable, yet it dismissed a petition seeking criminal investigation, forwarding the report instead to the President and Prime Minister.

Vice President Dhankhar questioned the constitutional basis of the in-house mechanism and called for a re-examination of the K Veeraswami judgment (1991), suggesting that the current legal framework grants excessive immunity to judges and hampers accountability.

Constitutional Safeguards and In-House Procedures

The Indian Constitution protects judicial independence through Article 124, which stipulates that judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts can only be removed through impeachment—a process that requires a special majority in Parliament. However, this safeguard has made judicial removal politically difficult. Despite several attempts, no judge has ever been successfully impeached since independence.

To address ethical complaints, the judiciary devised the in-house inquiry mechanism, wherein a panel headed by senior judges examines allegations against fellow judges. While this preserves the judiciary’s autonomy, the mechanism lacks statutory backing and has no power to impose penalties or recommend criminal prosecution.

The Veeraswami Judgment: Balancing Act or Bottleneck?

In the K Veeraswami case, the Supreme Court ruled that a judge could be treated as a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act. However, it mandated that any criminal case against a judge could proceed only with the approval of the Chief Justice of India (CJI), not the executive. This was intended to prevent misuse of prosecutorial powers and ensure judicial independence.

Critics argue that this judgment has created a judicial monopoly over sanctioning investigations, undermining public accountability. In practice, criminal prosecution against judges remains extremely rare. Notably, in 2019, then CJI Ranjan Gogoi sanctioned an FIR against Justice S.N. Shukla of the Allahabad High Court—one of the few instances of such approval.

Towards a Transparent and Accountable Judiciary

The current episode underscores a critical gap in India’s judicial accountability mechanisms. While independence is essential to prevent executive interference, absolute immunity risks eroding public confidence in the judiciary. The lack of transparency and enforceability in in-house inquiries has further exacerbated this perception.

There is a growing case for revisiting the Veeraswami judgment, possibly through constitutional or legislative reform, to allow limited and well-regulated avenues for criminal investigation into judicial misconduct—without compromising judicial independence.

Conclusion

A nuanced balance must be struck between judicial independence and accountability. India’s democracy cannot afford a judiciary that is either vulnerable to political manipulation or immune from public scrutiny. Strengthening internal accountability frameworks, reinforcing institutional checks, and ensuring transparency in disciplinary processes are essential to uphold both the dignity and integrity of the judiciary.